











CooperativesAbstract The evolution of the federated relationship between local and regional cooperatives is
examined from the perspective of local cooperatives’ need for commodity-based farm
supplies and regional cooperatives’ identity as food companies. Because locals want
many competing bids for the supplies they purchase, they resist a strong and close
affiliation with regional cooperatives, which then ﬁnd themselves with excess capacity.
Regionals have responded by instituting tighter bonds with selected local cooperatives
operating as "internal supply networks," in exchange for certain beneﬁts. This adapta-
tion reduces the impact of divergent goals among regionals and locals within the feder-
ated system.
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iiiHighlights Regional cooperatives have typically been regarded as leaders of cooperatively orga-
nized and owned marketing channels in the Midwest. They have relied on the custom-
ary power bases of channel leaders to induce member local cooperatives to follow
their lead. These include rewards, coercion, legitimacy, referent (identiﬁcation or asso-
ciation) power, and expertise.
These measures have been used in a cooperative culture that emphasizes the prima-
cy of services over proﬁts. This cultural model implies a regional will provide, essential-
ly at cost, most if not all of the services and products locals require. In turn, they will
supply the regional with the raw material it requires to manufacture supplies and
process foods. Survival of the regional cooperative relies on the support and patron-
age of local cooperatives.
This model breaks down when any of the following situations occur: locals can use
alternative suppliers; regionals have a higher cost of production than alternative suppli-
ers; locals are affiliated with multiple regionals; locals need product regionals don’t
make or can’t access; locals can meet their own needs internally; regionals need more
product than locals can provide; and the regional acquires an identity and existence of
its own, independent of locals.
The federated system particularly struggles with regionals’ cost of production versus
that of other suppliers. Cooperative norms stress the value of the "competitive yard-
stick" where the value of a cooperative lies primarily in its ability to provide an addition-
al bid to enhance market competition. Local cooperatives have frequently translated
this expectation into an implicit demand that the regional be the lowest bid. If it is not,
locals may perceive that their regional has not necessarily "added value" to the mar-
keting channel.
For their part, regionals with a strong presence in processed foods do not always know
how their locals ﬁt into the marketing channel. They perceive their strategies are driven
by market forces ﬁrst, and locals second.
Resolving these disconnects within the federated system could require a way for locals
to beneﬁt on a day-to-day basis from the processed foods business of regionals.
Currently, patronage beneﬁts are generally revolved only once a year. Locals need a
formal, institutionalized link to the food operations of their regionals.
Regionals may not always meet locals’ expectations as low-cost suppliers, because of
regionals’ approach to marketing and the rigidities of the cooperative system. So,
some locals may work independently of regionals. In other areas, a particular regional
and a selected group of member-locals may decide to collaborate on particular objec-
tives. These locals would form an "internal supply network," using an organizational
model more centralized than federated .
iiThe Changing Federated Relationship




Questioning the value provided by alternative
configurations of supply chains has become routine
throughout agribusiness, and cooperatives are no
exception. A business environment forced to measure
the profit of many transactions in pennies, not dollars,
has led local and regional cooperatives to ask whether
their prominent ties should be maintained in the cur-
rent form.
As suppliers to locals, regionals have sometimes
had ties with investor-owned firms (IOFs). Increasing
consolidation has brought a stronger market presence
for several mega-IOFs. Locals are increasingly asking
whether such companies are, in some cases, a better
partner for them than regionals. They ask, "What can a
regional cooperative do for me over and beyond what
an IOF can do?" Such questions, inconceivable in an
earlier era, have led regionals to wonder if locals will
continue to be part of a cooperatively organized sup-
ply chain in the same manner as in the past.
Many locals, of course, are very satisfied with the
way their regionals perform. But questions and chal-
lenges posed by some larger locals--superlocals or
mini-regionals--may influence how and what regionals
provide to locals in the future.
This report is an outgrowth of RBS Research
Report 181, Locals’ Role in the Identity-Preserved
Grain Industry (by Hogeland, 2001). In that study,
locals classified their approach to innovation as (1)
rapidly changing despite some financial risk; (2) delay-
ing in anticipation of further improvements; or (3)
focusing less on innovation than on perfecting service
and pricing within a particular arena. These responses
were classified as "innovator," "follower," and "status
quo" positions. Respondents were evenly divided
among these categories.
Innovators handled a much larger volume of
identity-preserved grain than cooperatives in follower
or status quo categories. Innovators often favored part-
nerships with regionals. Followers and status quo
appeared to adopt the cultural framework evident in
the grain industry, where regional cooperatives must
compete for locals’ grain the same as any other bidder.
The two groups were also similar in other ways.
Results indicate that most cooperatives prefer a
predictable environment where they function as
dependable, reliable suppliers. Although cooperative
culture favors incremental, slowly absorbed changes,
recent strategic alignments among regionals have
imposed uncomfortable change on some locals. It is
not always clear what membership in a cooperative
means, requires or provides in this new setting.
Where do locals get their standards to evaluate
regionals? How are those standards defined? This
study indicates many standards come from coopera-
tive culture--attitudes and marketing practices that dif-
ferentiate cooperatives from other business organiza-
tions. One of the most important is the familiar
"competitive yardstick" role.
The balance of power between regionals and
locals has shifted, altering how regionals express their
power as leaders of a cooperatively owned and orga-
nized marketing channel. Locals have developed a
degree of independent power, necessitating changes in
the distribution of labor between local and regional, as
well as in the expectations each has of the other. These
changes will be illustrated through a critique of a
model of cooperative behavior which focuses on the
1
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at NCR-194, Las
Vegas, NV October 30, 2001.primacy of services over profits. This study will also
focus on specialization and the development of inter-
nal supply networks as regionals’ response to such
countervailing power.
This study arose from conversations with numer-
ous local cooperative managers from June 2000 to June
2001. Executives of both federated and centralized
regionals also provided their perspective. The results
are expected to contribute to a more informed dialogue
on what cooperatives realistically can and cannot
accomplish, and not be evaluated by outdated stan-
dards.
This report is not a report card on the accelerated
pace of mergers and consolidations during the past
five years. That is a decision for those who own
regionals, locals and farmers. Instead, this report will
cast such events within a framework that will enable
cooperatives to understand them as inevitable answers
to challenges posed by market evolution.
Regionals’ Functions
Federated regionals market farm supplies, and
meat, dairy, and grain products. They include
Farmland, GROWMARK, CHS (formerly Cenex-
Harvest States), Land O’Lakes, MFA, Inc., and
Southern States Cooperative. The specific focus is
regional cooperatives serving the Midwest, where
most realignments and mergers have occurred.
Farm supply regionals typically contribute to
cooperative infrastructure and, indirectly, food pro-
cessing and marketing. Activities include:
  centralizing purchasing and distribution on
behalf of locals;
  building mills and other infrastructure needed
for ingredient processing and marketing;
  facilitating transportation by truck fleets, unit
trains or coordination with rail depots;
  lobbying regarding rail abandonment, trade
restrictions and other economic events;
  providing financing and other risk-manage-
ment tools; and
  training manager and employee and benefit
systems,
As food companies, regionals typically:
  create branded identities reflecting particular
standards of production or processing;
  provide an integrated marketing channel that
reaches from the farm gate to the dinner plate;
  provide market access;
  invest in food processing assets;
  partner with other agribusinesses to provide
the necessary complement of services and
products for locals;
  perform marketing research and training that
expands the reach of local cooperatives; and
  engage in overseas market development.
Who in the channel should perform these func-
tions is a question increasingly open to discussion as
some locals approach the size of early regionals. For
example, locals point to Felco, a 1970 merger partner of
Land O’Lakes, as an example of their own potential.
Nevertheless, explicit dialogue about the division of
labor among cooperatives at different levels has been
obscured, to some degree, by the considerable struc-
tural realignments and mergers among regional coop-
eratives.
Functions and Sources of Power
Countrymark, Inc. (Countrymark), a regional
cooperative formed from the 1991 merger of Indiana
Farm Bureau Cooperative Association and the
Ohio/Michigan-based Countrymark Cooperative rep-
resents an example of a "traditional" regional coopera-
tive whose service-oriented approach2 was jeopardized
by the forces described in this report. In 1998, Land
O’Lakes acquired what may be considered one of the
"core" businesses of Countrymark, its seed, agronomy,
and feed operations.3
Regionals like Countrymark can be regarded as
leaders of a cooperatively owned and organized mar-
keting channel with leadership based on locals’ will-
ingness to purchase or market in a particular way,
through a well-defined system and process, such as:
  using a regional’s brand name ("Farmland
Foods," "Land O’Lakes Pork System," etc.);
  using product standards established by the
regional (premixes with a particular nutrient
content or pork certification programs);
  using farm production supplies and other
products sourced or manufactured by the
regional;
  adhering to managerial and professional stan-
dards either originated by or endorsed by the
regional;
2
2 Other regional cooperatives, like SF Services (acquired by
Farmland in 1998), were similar to Countrymark.
3 Further details of this and other notable mergers and acquisitions
among cooperatives can be found in Wadsworth, James J.
Cooperative Unification: Highlights from 1989 to Early 1999,
USDA/Rural Business-Cooperative Service Research Report 174,
September 1999.  using similar accounting systems; and
  adhering to the strategic vision proposed by
the regional.
Adopting any of these practices is up to the
local. They do not automatically do what the
regional wants, unless they are owned (or central-
ly coordinated) by the regional and function like a
dealership or franchise.4 Most federated locals, the
subject of this report, selectively follow the lead of
their regional. They are not obliged to do business
with them.
Consequently, regionals must induce locals to fol-
low their lead, and like other (non-cooperative) chan-
nel leaders, they use a combination of positive and
negative reinforcements, such as :5
  rewards--potential benefits to locals, such as
manager placement within the cooperative sys-
tem; participation in advisory councils; financ-
ing or patronage refunds;
  coercion--unfavorable terms of trade or limited
managerial opportunities;
  legitimacy--internalized values that obligate
locals to accept regional influence;
  referent power--the value of explicit identifica-
tion or association with a regional;
  expertise--greater knowledge or experience
attributed to a regional.
These are examples of the power exerted by
channel leaders.
Power may seem to be an unusual term to use in
the context of cooperation, but the elements are largely
positive. Countrymark provided a particularly tempt-
ing model for cooperatives. Countrymark was said to
"do it all" and represented leadership based on the
benefits or rewards of regional affiliation.
Service Maximization Model and Critique
Some felt Countrymark exhausted its resources
serving member locals, in part by maintaining an
administrative structure perceived necessary to pro-
vide member services, as well as maintaining reputed-
ly unprofitable locations.
In many ways, Countrymark’s choices epitomize
many of the dilemmas facing regionals. Cooperative
culture emphasizes the primacy of services over prof-
its, an orientation familiar to Countrymark. In its
fullest expression, this model implies a regional will
provide, essentially at cost, most if not all of the ser-
vices and product locals require. In turn, locals will
supply the regional with the raw material it requires to
manufacture supplies and process foods. In this
model, the support and patronage of local coopera-
tives is a necessary and, conceivably, sufficient condi-
tion for the survival of the regional. Essentially, the
two exist in a closed, recursive (feedback) system,
impervious to outside influence.
The service model has several implicit assump-
tions:
  the regional will be the primary supplier to
locals;
  a local will be affiliated with only one regional;
  the regional’s cost of production (COP) is suffi-
ciently low so as to preclude competition from
alternative suppliers;
  locals will get all needed services from the
regional;
  locals will use the regional for market access or
marketing;
  the product received from locals is sufficient to
meet the regional’s requirements; and
  the role of the regional is to sustain the locals
that own it, but locals do not have a reciprocal
obligation toward their regional.
In reality, these assumptions break down
because:
  locals can pick and choose among suppliers,
regional or not.6
  the regional, because of its multi-product and
multi-service orientation, may have a higher
cost of production than alternative suppliers;
  locals are affiliated with more than one region-
al;
3
4 GROWMARK, MFA, Southern States, and Tennessee Farmers
Assn. fall into this catagory.
5 Hunt, Shelby D. and John R. Nevin, Power in a Channel of
Distribution: Sources and Consequences, Journal of Marketing
Research, Vol. 11 (May, 1974), 187.
6 GROWMARK, Tennessee Farmers Cooperative, MFA, and
Southern States Cooperative represent important exceptions to this
framework because their locals have institutionalized closer ties to
their regionals. These cooperatives have a mixed federated-
centralized structure   locals need products regionals don’t make or
can’t access;
  locals (or regionals) can meet their own needs
internally;
  locals can market on their own or choose chan-
nels other than their regional;
  the volume or quality of inputs from locals fall
short of the regional’s needs;
  the regional acquires an identity and existence
of its own, independent of locals;
  locals choose to be independent because they
want to differentiate themselves from other
agribusinesses, including their regional; and
  outside forces like government policies alter
exchange relations between local and regional.
This reality alters the effectiveness of regionals in
such culturally mandated roles as:
  being a competitive yardstick;
  creating change in the way industries are being
run;
  being a purveyor of technical change to locals;
  having facilities commensurate with those of
mega-IOFs;
  being a low cost supplier;
  being a multipurpose, multiservice organiza-
tion;
  generating income (returning patronage,
revolving equity);
  being a supplier of last resort (e.g., petroleum
during shortages);
  providing an integrated food system from farm
to grocer;
  maintaining staying power as a long-term sup-
plier; and
  providing market access.
These roles, which were identified through inter-
views with local cooperative managers, may be con-
sidered culturally determined. Typically, managers
viewed regionals’ effectiveness through the filter of
two or more potentially conflicting roles. For example,
local managers chided regionals because they were not
always the lowest cost supplier, and at the same time,
expected them to be as "basic" in certain supplies as
some mega-IOFs (presumably incurring high fixed
investment costs). Others wanted low-priced supplies
as well as a nice-sized patronage refund at the end of
the year.
Such conflicting expectations weigh in against
regionals’ power as channel leaders. Coupled with
some locals’ tendency (or ability) to operate indepen-
dently of regionals in the ways suggested by the ser-
vice model critique, they diminish the effectiveness of
the traditional supports for channel leadership--
rewards, legitimacy, etc.
Regionals have choices. They can try to "do more
of the same and do it better" or they can try to compel
locals’ attention if the traditional motivations are no
longer working. These include: (1) intensifying ties
with locals through specific incentives and manage-
ment structures (i.e., "regionalization"); (2) expanding
the arena for cooperatives through globalization; and
(3) making dealings with locals inevitable because the
regional is national seller of particular farm supplies.
Generally speaking, CHS has pursued regionalization;
Farmland, globalization; and Land O’Lakes, size and
scale.
In fact, these strategies are based on several of the
culturally mandated roles noted earlier.
Regionalization represents the local "as an extension of
the regional" in the context of a multipurpose, multi-
service organization limited to a particular geographic
area. Globalization stresses market access. Being a
dominant vendor of particular farm supplies is per-
haps a variation on the mega-IOF position of being
"basic" in certain commodities. These strategies coin-
cide with a more focused approach to delivering par-
ticular services through the recent formation of
Agriliance (combining the agronomy business of Land
O’Lakes, Farmland and CHS), Country Energy (con-
solidating the petroleum operations of Cenex, Harvest
States and Farmland), and the Land
O’Lakes/Farmland feed joint venture.
These arrangements represent a move by region-
als away from being multi-product to being product-
specialized.
Regional Specialization
The Resource Provider Function
In 1985, Prof. Brice Ratchford from the University
of Missouri predicted that separate systems for feed,
chemicals, fertilizer, etc., would replace the multipur-
pose farm supply distribution system. He also expect-
ed investor-owned competitors would have a pro-
found influence on the optimal role and structure of
cooperatives.7 In 2000, Harry Cleberg, past CEO of
4
7 C. Brice Ratchford, “Strategies for Cooperative System Design: The
Case for Coordination Among Cooperatives: Discussion,” in
Farmer Cooperatives for the Future, A Workshop Nov. 4-6, 1985,
USDA: Agricultural Cooperative Service, 116.Farmland Industries, similarly expected that each
regional would be associated with a single product
area--agronomy, petroleum, meat, grain, or dairy.8 This
realignment would occur in response to significant
environmental stressors, and ultimately alter tradition-
al ways of relating between locals and regionals.
These predictions concern regionals’ fundamental
identity as resource providers to locals, a function par-
ticularly evident when locals were smaller, single loca-
tion, and more numerous. By providing centralized
buying and distribution for locals, regionals eliminat-
ed the need for individual negotiation with suppliers.
Typical of a supply channel comprised of isolated and
autonomous decision-making units, locals were unable
to program distribution activities as effectively as their
regionals.9 The resulting asymmetrical power relations
between regionals and member locals made regionals
the natural choice for channel leaders. Locals seeking
alliances almost automatically turned to the nearest
regional cooperative.
Assisting this identification with a regional were
territorial and cultural boundaries. Just as local coop-
eratives often represent a particular group’s interest in
having its "own" cooperative, regionals, too, became
affiliated with specific commodity interests (Land
O’Lakes and dairy); farm movements (Cenex and
Farmers Union)10 and regions (Southern States
Cooperative and the Southeast). Scale economies
encouraged regionals, whose role as resource
providers includes manufacturing, to expand their
geographic boundaries, and in so doing, enter one
another’s territory.11 This process meant locals often
invested in--and therefore, were members of--more
than one regional.
As regional cooperatives (those that survive
today) broke through their traditional boundaries to
expand market share and so implicitly create the foun-
dation for specialization, locals learned to play a price
game: to cherry-pick regionals for the best deal.12 The
price game has continued despite the formation of
Agriliance and other ventures; locals simply substitute
IOF bids for those of multiple regionals.
In this price game is the core of how locals as a
group think of regionals: their purpose is to satisfy
their own need for commodities--petroleum, fertilizer,
feed, grain, some seed. These commodities are the gist
of what locals sell to their own farmer-members. These
members demand that locals help lower farm supply
costs. What regionals are known for, in contrast, is sell-
ing processed foods--meats, dairy, pasta, etc. This is
why interviewed locals referred to regionals as "food
companies."
A commodity orientation entails different needs
and resources than processed foods. Part of the reason
some locals have, according to interviews, a particular-
ly hard time valuing what regionals contribute to the
federated relationship is that they have no institutional
tie to the food operations of regionals. Farmers are tied
to the food operations of regionals through direct
membership. The better prices dairy farmers receive
from branded cheeses and the market access attained
by pork producers, for instance, flow from the regional
straight to the producer. The local is sidestepped.
Moreover, this disconnect has been institutional-
ized through the mixed membership structure of
Midwest regionals. Their membership is made up of
both locals (as a group or federation) and individuals
(representing producers in certain specialties). During
the past decade, there have been efforts by regionals to
tie locals to food production by having them sell spe-
cialty feed to the producers who are direct members.
Discrepancies among locals’ handling practices and
other coordination issues have led regionals to aban-
don this effort. Their need to streamline distribution,
to offer process-verified production systems for
processed foods, and to meet other requirements of a
marketplace geared to product consistency and food
safety has become paramount.
5
8 Cleberg, H.D., “Remarks: Cooperatives Working Together,” 2000
annual meeting of the National Society of Accountants for
Cooperatives, San Antonio, Tex., August 9, 2000.
9 McCammon,B.C., Jr., Perspectives for Distribution Programming,
in Vertical Market Systems, L.P. Bucklin, ed., Glenview, IL: Scott,
Foresman, 32-51.
10 Egerstrom observes that Cenex was founded by Farmers Union
organizations. Egerstrom, Lee, Make No Small Plans: A
Cooperative Revival for Rural America: Rochester, MN, Lone Oak
Press, 1994, 142.
11 Egerstrom refers to competition among regionals: “Will Land
O’Lakes” farm supply joint venture, known as Cenex/Land
O’Lakes Ag Services, need to tread on other regional
cooperatives’ turf to expand its markets and assure future
profits?” (p. 142). About Cenex, he says, “Changing rural
demograpics, changing agronomic practices on farms and
environmental restrictions on use of its products, and what
appears to be an inevitable geographic collision with Farmland
and other petroleum supply co-op create problems that need
creative responses” (p. 143).
12 The centralized nature of GROWMARK, MFA, Southern States,
and Tennessee Farmers Assn. means their member-locals will
automatically purchase most supplies from their regional as a
matter of course. The open market is much less of a factor in their
relationship than it is with the more independent locals based in
the core Midwest.Regionals are torn by the requirement to be
resource providers to locals and their own need to pro-
tect food manufacturing investments. The dual focus
of the federated system continually confronts regionals
with the strategic issue of whether a dollar of invest-
ment capital should go into providing the commodi-
ties needed by member locals or providing the
processed foods that are the core of regionals’ identi-
ty.13 This decision is complicated by the fact that food
operations can strengthen a regional’s balance sheet,
diminishing the requirement for equity investment by
local cooperatives.
The splintering of a multipurpose, multiproduct
cooperative structure into a meats company
(Farmland), a dairy company (Land O’Lakes); a grain
company (CHS), and an agronomy company
(Agriliance) represents an uneasy accommodation
with locals because it does not contribute, necessarily,
to an integrated food system--a seamless web from
farm to grocer. As long as each is essentially operating
on a different level--regionals in foods and locals in
commodities--the ability of locals to identify with
regionals (referent power) will be constrained. So, the
specialization advocated by Ratchford and Cleberg can
be seen either as a transitional step to a more fully
coordinated system (with the next step still unclear) or
as a way of formalizing the disconnect between the
two levels by compartmentalizing it.
How far should specialization go?
Regionals perceive that Agriliance and other
instances of horizontal integration "take costs out of
the market," although, to some locals, eliminating mul-
tiple regional bids can appear more like "taking com-
petition from the marketplace." Locals’ position as
middlemen limits their endorsement of a streamlined
marketing system. The more bids they can sift
through, the more they fulfill and justify their histori-
cally designated role.
Farmers innately fear situations where they get
only one bid, and regional specialization is interpreted
by some as a move in this direction. So it’s not surpris-
ing that the short-term consequence of specialization
has been some degree of share loss. A year after imple-
mentation, interviewed regionals commented that
their collective market share through the specialized
and combined ventures has been less than what they
used to get selling individually. Locals’ reaction to
restructuring makes it far harder for regionals to real-
ize intended cost savings.
By massing the business of several regionals into
one large entity, specialization opens up the possibility
for each of the new companies to catapult into a posi-
tion of industry leadership. From regionals’ perspec-
tive, this is a good strategy. It diminishes the relevance
of a price game and the dominant position serves to
compel member-locals’ attention. But it is not a strate-
gy locals are used to. Despite the fact that the Capper-
Volstead Act looks favorably on large cooperatives,
members sometimes find them hard to accept, asking,
"Is that what a cooperative should be?" This reveals a
cultural preference for cooperatives that are "big--but
not too big."
Culture aside, such a move conceivably positions
regionals to take competition to the next level, from a
focus on day-to-day commodity prices to a system ori-
entation. The trace-back and identity-preserved meth-
ods of food production and safety embodied in a sys-
tems approach have become a way for food processors
to differentiate themselves in the marketplace.
Farmland’s speedy application of USDA- approved
process-verified pork production demonstrated that
regional cooperatives are aware of what they need to
do.
Paper-thin margins industry-wide coupled with a
cultural bias toward competition-as-a-way-of-life may
prevent many locals from stepping back and assessing
how--and whether--they will position themselves for
this further evolution of the food system. Study of
locals’ response to identity-preserved grains indicates
that most maximize the prices received for their pro-
ducer-members’ grain by maximizing the number of
bids. Different paths to the same end (livestock feed-
ing, processed products) were hard for all but the most
adventurous and innovative to see. Therefore, for spe-
cialization or industry prominence to be accepted by
locals, regionals must generate the patronage refunds
that are the singular perquisite of a dominant supplier
that is also a cooperative. Patronage refunds are the
link between the old and new ways of doing things,
the one thing that can reassure locals that a system
they may have trouble endorsing will in fact perform
like--or even better than--the old.
6
13 In describing Harvest States, Egerstrom observes, “But the bulk of
the cooperative’s profits come from the processing businesses, not
the grain trading for which the co-op is widely known” (p. 134).
Egerstrom also cites Dr. Robert Cropp regarding a similar focus
by Land O’Lakes, “There is still room for growth in all of Land
O’Lakes business sectors, but the surest way to is to reach out
territorily and to raise up the foods...We know there are going to
be fewer and fewer animals in Wisconsin and Minnesota, this
can’t be the only place where the company does business”: (p.
141). Regarding Farmland’s business mix, Egerstrom says, “food
sales {are expected to be} emerging on top by 1995” (p. 137).To do this, regionals will have to consistently
make money. Regionals put this goal as, "Make money
every day. Run a commercial business." Twenty years
ago, the pre-eminence of the service model would
have made such statements sound heretical, if not
impossible. Making money, achieving profitability, is
the antithesis of the service model of cooperatives.
Regionals that formerly sought to induce member
business and loyalty through special programs or pro-
motions (as the rewards of channel leadership) may
have a better chance at overriding any tendency to
stray from the federated relationship by commanding
respect through patronage refunds and focused
growth.
Competitive Yardstick
Some observers have interpreted specialization as
a way of getting locals accustomed to one bid, to con-
strain their tendency to play one regional against
another. This may be difficult behavior to modify
because cooperative culture has looked favorably upon
multiple bids and even used them to justify coopera-
tives.
Specifically, when multiple suppliers and differ-
ing production costs exist, cooperative culture ascribes
the role of "competitive yardstick" to regional coopera-
tives: providing an additional bid in the marketplace
to minimize the possibility of collusive or monopolistic
behavior among suppliers. Note that the competitive
yardstick argument does not require the regional to
have the winning bid, but rather keep everyone honest
by adding market competition.
The expectation that regionals will supply prod-
uct essentially at cost (a dimension of the service
model) apparently has led locals to expect that region-
als will be, as one observer said, "always and at all
times the lowest bid." If regionals turn out to be simply
an additional bid because someone else was cheaper,
interviewed locals have concluded that their regionals
have been ineffective. Ironically, Nourse, the philo-
sophical founding father of Midwestern cooperation,
justified the formation of locally owned cooperatives
based on this idea of providing an extra bid,14 but the
role is apparently of little practical value when locals
assess the performance of their regionals. Many locals
themselves may owe their existence to producers’
interest in maximizing the terms of trade on any par-
ticular day, without getting bogged down in invest-
ment requirements or equity valuation. As a group,
locals seem to view regionals through the same lens.
In contrast, interviewed regionals see their role as
providing "reasonable" or "fair" prices, measured by an
annualized rolling average, for example. They empha-
size that they are "competitive in value," implying that
the total package of auxiliary services and technical
support combine with the product price to provide a
satisfactory transaction for most locals, most of the
time. Expertise continues to be a critical part of chan-
nel leadership, such as Land O’Lakes’ continuing lead-
ership and innovation in animal nutrition.
Many locals, fully satisfied with their regionals,
would agree with these performance criteria.
Nevertheless, the competitive yardstick is not enough
to ensure regionals’ future. They must make money
consistently.
How regionals achieve such profitability is
another issue. Although locals want their regionals to
position themselves as low-cost suppliers (the regional
would almost always be the lowest bid), regionals
resist for a variety of reasons:
  A low-cost supplier position is eroded when
the lowest price is adopted as the industry
standard. When industry demand is fixed or
overcapacity exists, such competition can
become destructive. No one gains.
  Regionals want to convey a consistent vision to
their farmer and end-use customers regarding
product standardization and performance. The
stand-alone price preferred by some member
locals could lead to a mix-and-match approach
(combining products of several vendors) that
would dilute this message.
  A low-cost supplier position is always vulnera-
ble to being eroded by import competition (i.e.,
fertilizer) or scale economies from the latest
version of manufacturing technology.
Cooperatives lack the financial resources to be
at the forefront of every technological advance.
Regionals prefer to emphasize quality over
price because they believe that, long term, this
will give them the ability to "pick and choose"
their customer.
  Regionals have obligations of ownership,
investment, and use that result in a certain
rigidity in the federated system. Just because
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epitomize the Nourse philosophy of cooperation--that of a
‘competitive yardstick’ with the objective to keep investor-
oriented firms competitive.” See Egerstrom, 146.an Oklahoma location would have a lower cost of pro-
duction does not mean that a North Dakota coopera-
tive can simply pull up stakes and move there.
  Getting multiple bids ("the price game") may
be an economically rational activity for individ-
ual locals. From a systems perspective, howev-
er, their preference for shopping around means
the federated system faces higher transaction
costs than one conducive to forecasts of cus-
tomer (local) demand and inventory levels.
Because regionals must market themselves to
member locals, resources are diverted from
improving member-local service to ensuring a
certain level of industry competition.
Detachment among Locals
Given their position as food companies with pro-
cessing plants to run and contracts to fulfill, regionals
can’t depend on having the best bid on any given day.
For locals that favor absolutes, all that matters is that
the regional be the lowest bid today. That detachment
has led some locals to operate in what several man-
agers described as an "arms length" relationship with
regionals. Detachment maintains the historically desig-
nated separation of roles in the federated system, but
may be an anachronism in terms of agriculture’s
increasing emphasis on systems built from interdepen-
dent stages.15
Detachment may also create a free-rider problem
within the federated system. Members may invest--and
bid--only the minimum necessary to sustain the region-
al as an additional bid. This behavior is at odds with the
interest expressed by other industry segments in part-
nering or supply chain management.16 When the bid is
the singular measure of performance, all other aspects
of locals’ generally multifaceted investment in the
regionals are vulnerable to being considered an "unpro-
ductive investment."17
As a strategy, detachment is useful in keeping
suppliers off balance. No one can depend on getting an
order at any given time. Short-term contracts are the
norm, with negotiations continually re-opened on the
basis of new market information.18 Moreover, buyers
may be secretive about their needs, fearing market
share disclosures may result in pricing according to
"what the market can bear." This attitude was not
unknown among interviewed locals.
Detachment also presupposes suppliers are inter-
changeable. There is no difference in their ability to
provide product enhancements, training, or other
attributes important to locals.19
This strategy may have been reasonable when the
marketing environment was composed of multiple,
competing regionals. Now that interdependence, long-
term contracts, or a systematic approach to addressing
the needs of producers (or end-use customers) is need-
ed, it is less adaptive.
Regional as Self-Sustaining Entity
Federated locals have the right but not the obliga-
tion to do business with their regional. They are free to
sift among bids. Local managers interviewed for this
study who operated closer to a dealership mode,20 that
is, routinely accepting some products or policies from
their regional, did not manifest the dissatisfaction of
other managers.
This is an important point. Even though conflict
is an intrinsic part of any marketing channel (not as an
end in itself but as a means to some economic objec-
tive),21 more regionals may find themselves favoring
policies that make the local an extension of the region-
al and so minimize conflict. That policy virtually guar-
antees that there will be a market for the supplies sold
by the regional as well as product from locals to fill
processing and export contracts.
Industry competition in developing and sustain-
ing branded processed foods (including slotting fees
and advertising) reduces regionals’ ability to control
their own destiny. Industry observers comment that
the profitability of particular brands depends on the
product choices of the very small number of major gro-
cers. Casting locals in the role of internal suppliers
reduces one element of uncertainty. With this "captive
market," there is less risk that a regional’s facilities will
be underused. Essentially, this is a way for regionals to
protect their investment in manufactured foods, in
particular.
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Westport, Connecticut: Quorum Books, 2001.
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Equal, Business Marketing, May 1986.
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18 Day, George S., Market Driven Strategy. New York: The Free
Press, 1990, 228.
19 Ibid.
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21 Stern, Louis W. and Torger Reve, Distribution Channels as
Political Economies: A Framework for Comparative Analysis,
Journal of Marketing (44), Summer 1980, 53.Regionals are then taking actions to preserve
their own self-interest. This is completely at odds with
the notion (from the service model) that the regional’s
role is not to sustain itself, but the locals who own it.
Most core Midwestern locals interviewed for this
study, particularly superlocals, resisted any concept of
themselves as a captive market. Their individual
strengths allow them to scrutinize the federated sys-
tem more closely than smaller locals more dependent
on regionals. Superlocals see that the federated system
as a whole has developed an infrastructure reflecting
the needs and priorities of multiple regionals (some no
longer in existence) and, of course, multiple locals.
This infrastructure may not necessarily be well posi-
tioned or sufficiently streamlined to meet some super-
local needs. So, they may build their own.
Such asset duplication, while not ideal from the
standpoint of the system as a whole, is probably
inevitable. It reflects the fact that the federated system
is more parochial than centrally planned or adminis-
tered. Federation’s greatest strength, responsiveness to
individual rural communities, is also a weakness, inso-
far as it creates a system somewhat improvised and
piecemeal. This issue is not particular to the federated
system. IOFs also struggle with top-down/bottom-up
issues as they switch back and forth from centralized
businesses to individual business unit (profit) centers.
Some Predictions
Internal supply networks will probably become a
more pronounced feature of the cooperative landscape
as a way to "force" a coordinated system. In the core of
the Midwest, such networks have always implicitly
existed because regionals had the power of channel
leadership to decide, for instance, which of two locals
would merit a new feed mill. Now these networks will
become explicit as the federated system becomes more
centralized, approaching (at the extreme) the manner
defined by Cobia:
Centralized cooperatives have no autonomous
local association members. Instead, they have
branches, retail outlets and, in a few cases, fran-
chise dealers. Operational control and authority
are centralized in the headquarters of the cooper
ative. Individuals are direct members. . .
Operation of local units is vested in a manager
hired by the management of the centralized coop-
erative.22
Cobia observes that the local units of centralized
cooperatives are more easily standardized in product
and services, leading to a lower cost system. A low-
cost system is just what is needed for commodities that
have reached the stage of product maturity.
Cobia also identifies three disadvantages of a fed-
erated system--less control and coordination over
product flow between regionals and locals; locals’ free-
dom to bypass regionals; and divergent goals at each
level. It is clear that these have emerged as destabiliz-
ing factors in the federated system. Although central-
ized regionals face the risk of operating at both the
regional and the local level, they may offer locals more
of a stake in the strategic goals pursued by regionals,
and so, in important ways, may correspond to the
needs of the emerging marketplace better than a pure-
ly federated system.23
Need for Focus
GROWMARK, a federated cooperative serving
Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin and Ontario, has often been
regarded as centralized because key distribution deci-
sions are made by the regional. In important ways, it
may be a prototype of the internal supply networks
being spawned to the North and West. Focusing on a
relatively narrow segment of agriculture, corn and
soybeans, has given GROWMARK a unity of purpose
not evident in the experience of other, more diversified
regionals.
The potential to offset losses in one commodity
with gains in another has been regarded as a powerful
economic argument supporting diversified, multipur-
pose organizations. Nevertheless, cross subsidization
does not necessarily appeal to cooperative members
(local or producer). Those representing different com-
modity or processed foods constituencies have fre-
quently challenged regionals to be industry leaders in
each of their various enterprises--dairy, hog produc-
tion, fertilizer, red meats, grains, poultry, etc. The
greater the diversity, the greater the pressure.
Setting priority goals and perhaps settling for
"second-best" in some areas does not seem to be an
option for most of the federated system, due to politics
and scale economies. Consequently, the cooperative
record in commodities and foods is somewhat check-
ered--intense involvement in some areas followed by
withdrawal, followed by a tentative re-entry. This may
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speculation about what these might be is beyond the scope of this
report.be considered both an economic and organizational
shortcoming indicating that the federated system does
not respond well to complexity.
The less-diluted focus of the GROWMARK sys-
tem may be aided by its relationship with Archer-
Daniels Midland (ADM), which encapsulates the foods
business and allows GROWMARK (as a regional) to
focus on the more commodity-oriented concerns of
member locals. This minimizes conflict between the
two levels. GROWMARK also takes a bottom-up
approach, allowing centralized decision-making to
occur in a setting where the regional regards itself as
"nothing more than what its locals are (or aspire to)."
This philosophy moves GROWMARK closer to a defi-
nition of the federated ideal:
Distributor and manufacturer working partner-
ships [are defined as] the extent to which there is
mutual recognition and understanding that the
success of each firm depends in part on the other
firm, with each firm consequently taking actions
so as to provide a coordinated effort focused on
jointly satisfying the requirements of the cus-
tomer marketplace.24
GROWMARK defines its purpose as serving
member locals, and through them, the farmer. This is
also the view of other regionals who have a large sup-
ply or agronomy business. The more specific or spe-
cialized a cooperative is, the easier it may be to identi-
fy and respond to the expectations of the member
owner.
Customer choice is not a clear-cut decision for
cooperatives. Diversified food-based regionals believe
that the federated system’s goal is to produce more of
what the market (consumers or farmers) wants, when
it wants. Although locals want to be seen as the driver
of the federated relationship because they own region-
als, the real driver is the customer. Interviewed region-
als observed that customer decisions do not take into
account whether a local was part of the marketing
channel. Standardization, quality, timing of delivery,
etc., matter far more than cooperative organization.
Consequently, regionals were not always sure
how locals fit into the marketing channel, as shown by
issues raised during interviews:
  Should we always go through a local?
  Does it stand in the way of the customer to do
business with locals?
  How much of our energies and resources must be
devoted to getting locals included in the solutions
we have devised for our end-use consumers?
  Who will be key in the relationship with the
farmer, the local or regional?
  At the end of the day, who is the customer of
the regional--the farmer, local cooperative, or
end-use consumer?
Most food-based Midwestern regionals define
their customer as farmers or end-users, not locals.25
They are also more directly and visibly involved in the
food business than GROWMARK. Could they be as
successful in foods if they defined locals as their cus-
tomers? Most would probably say no. However, this
issue remains an important conceptual and empirical
challenge for the federated system because cooperative
culture demands that certain stake-holders, like small
farmers and locals, be included in the organizational
framework, irrespective of their economic contribu-
tion.
New Rules for Competition
A centralized system or internal supply network
can be viewed as a network of firms (or cooperatives).
Market analysts have observed that global competition
is increasingly occurring between networks of firms,
such that "to be an effective competitor (in the global
economy) requires one to be a trusted cooperator (in
some network)."26 Yet cooperatives’ culturally based
need for an adversary has prevented them from gain-
ing maximum benefit from existing federations.
Bringing together an assortment of producers or
locals may require a mechanism to dampen percep-
tions of individual differences so collective action can
take place. Identifying an adversary--another regional
cooperative, a mega-IOF or some other entity--may
help define what a cooperative is by defining what it is
not.
Prior to specialization, interviewed regionals
viewed their competition almost exclusively as "other
regionals." Interviews suggest that carryover from this
"us against them" approach has made it harder for
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Marketing (54), January 1990, 42.cooperatives formed from mergers to transcend their
previous cultures and commit to a new one. Lingering
attitudes toward former IOF competitors may also
forestall the interdependence necessary to surmount
limited resources by learning to survive in a concen-
trated marketplace.
In an environment defined by a limited number
of buyers and sellers, a firm--especially a mega-IOF--
may be a competitor in one context and a partner in
another. In their resource provider function, regionals
have had sufficient exposure to IOFs on a day-to-day
basis so that they can comfortably accept partnerships
or joint ventures as a logical outgrowth of this process.
Locals may have more difficulty with a complex
"friend" and "foe" view. This could be an outgrowth of
locals’ cultural bias (evidenced in the price game)
toward a "win-lose" mentality.
A particular example of market complexity arises
when a regional’s response to some market contin-
gency (such as an acute, short-term need for facilities
or resources to maintain production flow) leaves locals
out of the loop. To locals that have invested heavily in
the federated system, this is not what the cooperative
system is about.
In turning to the nearest IOF (not the nearest
local), regionals reveal that they are motivated less by
governance issues, i.e., how market arrangements are
governed, than by the dictates of competitive advan-
tage, such as a speedy outcome or resolution. This
means regionals will probably take other actions that,
in a particular context, could appear to go against the
grain of cooperative practices and norms. Regionals
perceive that their strategies are determined by market
forces first, locals second.
Since the federated system is critically dependent
on the performance of the small number of regionals,27
yet control rests with an essentially fragmented and
diverse group of locals, regionals will probably try to
push the limits of culturally accepted behavior. If like-
ly conflicts with governance result, regionals will
probably buffer themselves by increased reliance on
internal supply networks.
Whether member complaints about how equity is
being used will redirect the federated system is
unclear. The lines of control and accountability are not
necessarily firmly drawn in the federated system.
Specialized ventures like Agriliance represent an effort
by regionals to impose greater transparency on the
federated system, but overlap and fuzzy boundaries
will probably persist due to the complexity of coopera-
tives as an organizational form.
Cultural Inﬂuences
Federated cooperatives are responsible to many
stakeholders and influences. These include:
  Industry cultures as a context for cooperation--
cooperation has a different meaning for dairy
producers than for those specialized in grain or
pork.
  Rural communities--cooperatives are often a
mainstay of their communities. Closing a feed
mill or elevator can cost a community jobs and
income.
  Predecessor farm organizations--Farm Bureau,
for example, differs from Farmers Union in
governance preferences, scope of activity, and
attitude toward cooperation.
  Geographic preferences--the South uses farm
stores; the Midwest, local cooperatives;
California does neither.
  American values--individualism and a "can do"
pioneer spirit, traits usually associated with
livestock producers, are generally considered
incompatible with cooperation, although there
are important exceptions.
  Particular stakeholders--notably, small or "fam-
ily farm" operators.
  New Generation Cooperatives--these offer a
competing model of ownership and investment
structures.
  IOFs, particularly mega-IOFs--these are far
more driven by profit than service concerns.
Yet, cooperatives seeking to close outdated,
out-of-position assets may turn to this model.
  European or other international models of
cooperation.
These examples represent some of the particular
contexts or situations in which cooperation can occur.
Each culture will place a different value on coopera-
tion and expect different things from cooperatives.
Nevertheless, there are certain universal principles
that will always define cooperatives or cooperation
irrespective of context. These are:28
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Agricultural Cooperative Service, 1987, 31.  User ownership—A cooperative is owned by
its members;
  User control—A cooperative is controlled by its
members;
  User benefits—The benefits of the cooperative
accrue to its members.
Cooperatives are collective organizations and so
encompass more than one point of view or objective.
But cultural influences can conflict, pushing and
pulling a cooperative in different directions. Managing
these interdependencies and agendas is the key task
for the cooperative sector in the next decade, replacing
the 1990s focus on managing scale economies.
Interviewed regionals saw this as a primary way they
could uniquely add value to the federated system.
Cooperatives are known as comparatively self-
contained, even insular organizations. Maintaining the
integrity of the universal principles will become an
even more important task in the future as cooperatives
necessarily engage other organizations in their quest to
serve farmers.
Discussion and Conclusions
Regional cooperatives have typically been
regarded as leaders of cooperatively organized and
owned marketing channels. They have relied on the
customary power bases of channel leaders to induce
member local cooperatives to follow their lead. These
include rewards, coercion, legitimacy, referent power,
and expertise. These measures have been used in a
cooperative culture that emphasizes the primacy of
services over profits. This cultural model implies a
regional will provide, essentially at cost, most if not all
of the services and products locals require. In turn,
locals will commit to the regional the raw material it
requires to either acquire or manufacture supplies and,
also, process foods. The support and patronage of
member local cooperatives constitutes conceivably, a
necessary and sufficient condition for the survival of a
regional cooperative.
In reality, this model can break down in several
ways. For example, locals may have other suppliers;
regionals may have a higher cost of production than
alternatives; multiple regional affiliations exist; locals
may need that product regionals don’t make or can’t
access; locals may meet their own needs internally;
regionals may need more product than locals can pro-
vide; and the regional may acquire an identity and
existence of its own, independent of locals.
The federated system particularly struggles with
regionals’ cost of production relative to that of other
suppliers. Cooperative norms stress the importance of
the "competitive yardstick," where the value of a coop-
erative lies primarily in its ability to provide an addi-
tional bid to enhance market competition for com-
modities. Local cooperatives have frequently
translated this expectation into an implicit demand
that the regional be the lowest bid. If it is not, locals
may perceive that their regional has not necessarily
"added value" to the marketing channel.
Moreover, the patronage-generating processed
foods operations of regionals do not "add value" to the
federated system on a day-to-day basis in ways that
would contribute to a more unified, cohesive system.
An alternative mechanism is needed to give the com-
modity-oriented locals more reason to identify with
the often food-oriented regionals. Otherwise, the
divergence between the two levels of the federated
system could increase to a point where the system is
irrevocably fractured.
Locals and regionals necessarily pursue different
goals. Among cooperative supporters, the promise of
"farm gate to plate" has been an enticing vision. But
this cultural mandate has required the federated sys-
tem to twist and stretch itself to encompass two dis-
tinct systems, food and unprocessed commodities.
They often conflict over issues of resources, infrastruc-
ture, and customer definition. It is not easy, and maybe
not even possible, for the federated system to integrate
inputs (farm supplies) with outputs (processed prod-
ucts). To date, the best the federated system has been
able to do is to compartmentalize commodity and food
operations. The recently formed, specialized ventures
like Agriliance, Country Energy, and the Land
O’Lakes/Farmland feed joint venture as well as the
compartmentalized relationship between the grain
operations of GROWMARK and the foods business of
ADM are examples of this process.
For their part, regionals with a strong presence in
processed foods do not always know how their locals
fit into the marketing channel. They perceive that their
strategies are driven by market forces first, locals sec-
ond.
Locals derive meaning and existence from the
constant comparative price-shopping imposed on
them by the nature of the commodities they handle.
Locals want regionals to fit into the demands of this
system by being low-cost suppliers. Yet, the way
regionals approach marketing and certain rigidities of
the cooperative system may preclude this, to some
degree. The multiproduct and multiservice aspect of
regionals can prevent them from attaining the special-
12ization that usually supports a low-cost supplier posi-
tion. This may mean that some locals may at times
operate outside the federated system.
Patronage refunds--the singular prerogative of a
cooperative supplier--may bring these locals back. To
accomplish this, regionals will have to consistently
make money, every day. Running a commercial busi-
ness and achieving consistent profitability is a tall
order for a cooperative sector nurtured on the concept
of service as an end-goal. But regionals that formerly
sought to induce member business and loyalty
through special programs or promotions (as the
rewards of channel leadership) may have a better
chance at overriding any tendency to stray from the
federated relationship by commanding respect
through patronage refunds and focused growth.
In other areas, greater commitment to the federat-
ed system may occur as individual regionals and
selected member-locals decide to collaborate on specif-
ic objectives. These locals would form an "internal sup-
ply network" for their regionals, using an organiza-
tional model more centralized than federated.
The dual focus of the federated system is
revealed in the structural tendencies of the system.
Locals generally gravitate to a strategy of horizontal
integration and regionals, vertical integration.
Conflicts over the goals, commitment, and perfor-
mance of the federated system as a whole are the result
of perceptual differences at each level of cooperation.
Often, regionals and locals each pay attention to and
value different things. Continuous and severe industry
competition reinforces this tunnel vision and distracts
the federated system (as a whole) from developing a
broad-based unifying vision, a concept of what could
be. The promise of "farm gate to plate" will never be
exploited to its full potential across the federated sys-
tem until regionals and locals see themselves more as
partners than as adversaries or competitors. Until
then, implementation of this vision will be spotty and
localized, restricted to areas where internal supply net-
works are in place.
The environment is ripe for new organizational
forms and terms. The regional-local distinction may be
outdated and may perpetuate paternalistic notions of
channel leadership that have lost meaning in a world
of locals, superlocals, and regionals. South Dakota
Wheat Growers, the world’s largest local cooperative,
covers more territory than some "regionals." Is it really
appropriate to call it a local, and bring to mind all the
territorial and service limitations associated with this
concept?
The challenge for the federated system is to
evolve to a system of partnerships, of networks, to
minimize or eliminate the top-down frame of reference
embodied in the notion of regional cooperatives as
channel leaders. This may be occurring in a small way
with the development of internal supply networks,
where groups of locals more closely associate them-
selves with a regional cooperative in exchange for cer-
tain benefits. It is possible prominent superlocals will
develop their own internal supply networds and so the
federated system will evolve to a level of greater com-
plexity.
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